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INTUITION, GENDER AND THE UNDER-REPRESENTATION OF 
WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY
Abstract
Recently, Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich have argued that there are different 
gender philosophical intuitions and that these differences may play a role in explaining 
the marginalization of women philosophers. To the contrary, I defend the view that 
intuitions are in part socially constructed and the product of stereotypical behaviours. 
My paper has two aims: firstly, to offer some speculations about the effect of Buckwalter 
and Stich’s hypothesis and to focus on whether ‘intuition’ is a gendered notion; secondly, 
to argue that Buckwalter and Stich’s approach is inadequate, by showing that the data 
in the studies they report are insufficient to support their conclusion and that their 
thesis does not comply with the view that gender differs from one society to another.
Although in recent decades many departments have been committed to equal 
opportunity policies, women remain a minority in academia and are seriously 
under-represented in philosophy1. What are the causes of this gender disparity? 
Might gender differences help to explain the gender gap in philosophy depart-
ments? Recently, Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich (hereafter B&S) have 
argued that women and men tend to have different philosophical intuitions and 
that these differences may play a role in explaining the under-representation of 
women in philosophy in the English speaking world2.
In what follows, I defend the view that intuitions are in part socially con-
structed and a product of stereotypical behaviours, and argue that philosophical 
intuitions are gendered. The paper is divided in two parts. In the first, I present 
1 Haslanger 2008; Valian 1998 e 2005.
2 B&S precise that they have found this difference in contemporary American and Canadian 
women and men with little or no philosophical training. 
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B&S’s view as characterized by two theses: (i) there are significant differences 
between men and women in intuitive responses to some philosophically im-
portant thought experiments; (ii) women’s intuitions do not accord with those 
that professional philosophers insist are correct. In the second part of the paper, 
I indicate why B&S’s approach is inadequate, by arguing that their thesis does 
not comply with the view that gender is a social construction. Further, in the last 
two paragraphs, I discuss whether intuitions are gendered by showing the differ-
ence between weak and strong gendered notions, and I suggest that intuitions 
are gendered in a weak sense, namely they are appropriate to a social male role.
1. B&S’s hypothesis
B&S stress that the gender imbalance in philosophy has more than one 
cause. Nonetheless, in their paper they focus on one of these factors that (they 
believe) may significantly contribute to this phenomenon, namely the differ-
ences in intuitions between women and men. According to them, the fact that 
women have the “wrong” philosophical intuition more frequently than men 
may be one of the factors that exclude them from the “Philosophers’ Club”3. 
Although they note that the reason for the gender differences in philosophical 
intuition is still unknown, and while they do not claim to suggest that differ-
ences in intuitions are the only factor involved, their intention is to offer some 
speculations about the effect of these differences. B&S suspect that intuitions 
may be associated with gender. For example, women and men tend to differ with 
respect to Gettier-intuition or extended-mind intuitions4, and there is evidence 
of gender difference in other classic thought experiments as well5. In the light 
of the data, their hypothesis is that women and men have different philosophi-
cal intuitions and that men’s intuitions conform more closely to philosophical 
intuition than do women’s. But, if this hypothesis is correct, why does it help 
to explain the under-representation of women in philosophy? 
Intuitions play an important role in Western philosophy, especially in analytic 
philosophy. By “intuition”, B&S mean “philosophical intuition”, namely «people’s 
spontaneous responses to thought experiments»6. Usually, when they invoke an 
intuition, philosophers assume that the propositional content of that intuition is 
likely to be true. So, the propositional content of that intuition – philosophers 
believe – can be used as evidence. Intuitions play a role in philosophy similar 
3 Buckwalter, Stich 2011.
4 Buckwalter, Stich 2014: 6-7.
5 Ivi: 8-28.
6 Ivi: 4.
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to that of perception or observation in empirical science: namely, they are taken 
as evidence for or against a thesis7.
Still, philosophers take spontaneous judgments or answers as philosophical 
intuitions. More precisely, most philosophers take their spontaneous answers 
to be obvious and their intuitions to be evidence. Indeed, philosophers often 
disagree about their intuitions, but they do not usually try to defend them. 
When philosophers have an intuition that p and believe that the propositional 
content of p is likely to be true, they usually take p as premise in a philosophical 
argument. This is particularly evident, for example, in a Gettier-style thought 
experiment. If philosophers have the intuition that the character in a Gettier 
case does not know that p, they take the content of this intuition as evidence 
against the account of knowledge as justified-true-belief. More exactly, they 
use the propositional content of that intuition as a premise (S does not know 
that p) in the argument they are construing. So, they offer an argument which, 
from this premise, draws the conclusion that the justified-true-belief account 
of knowledge is false. In a case like this, philosophers rarely explain why this 
intuitively supported premise their argument relies on seems to them to be 
true. Rather, if someone denies that this premise is true, namely that the Get-
tier protagonist does not know that p, the philosopher might think that the 
interlocutor does not understand crucial details of the case at issue, is ignoring 
them, or does not remember them. So, given that in philosophy it is generally 
assumed to be obvious that the Gettier protagonist does not know that p, the 
philosopher might attempt to correct the interlocutor or convince them that 
they are mistaken. In the next section, I will concentrate on B&S’s explanation 
of the role played by intuition in philosophical education. 
2. Intuition as evidence in philosophical education
The gender disparity, B&S suspect, may also have to do with the role that 
intuition plays in the teaching and learning of philosophy8. Let us consider a 
philosophy class in which, for instance, professor and students are discussing a 
Gettier problem. In a context like this, professors (mostly men) systematically 
correct students who have deviant intuitions. If it is the case that it is mainly 
female students who have the deviant intuitions, then these students may feel 
confused or uncomfortable; they may find the experience of having intuitions 
that do not coincide with those of their professors and male classmates puzzling 
and alienating. As a result, if they are told that they have the wrong intuitions, 
female students may feel discouraged from pursuing their interest in philosophy. 
7 Ivi: 3-6.
8 Ivi: 29-37.
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If this is so, it is plausible to think that female students may become convinced 
that they are not good at philosophy, drop out from their philosophy class or 
give up the idea of starting a career in academia. 
The use of intuition as evidence in philosophical education may contribute to 
the gender gap in philosophy in a different way as well. The fact that it is mostly 
female students who have deviant intuitions may have a dramatic effect on the 
way professors select their students9.. Becoming a good philosopher requires 
certain abilities and skills: being very clever and able to make interesting ques-
tions or answer them, being good at debating and at rigorous argument, and 
so on. Another requirement for philosophers is to be able to make spontaneous 
judgments and give immediate answers (i.e. intuitions) to questions posed by 
a philosophical issue that they are discussing together. Thus, professors may be 
inclined to think that male students are brighter than female students because 
male students – unlike the majority of their female classmates – participate ac-
tively in discussion and their intuitions do not conflict with those of professional 
philosophers. Given that female students often fail to meet the requirements for 
being good philosophers that we have examined above, many professors may 
conclude that they are not sufficiently bright and, consequently, discourage 
them from pursuing philosophy. And even if female students continue their 
studies, pursuing a successful academic career will probably be harder (or will 
take longer) for them than for males.
Therefore, B&S argue, if intuitions play an important role in philosophy 
education, then gender differences in intuition become a crucial factor in pro-
voking a sequence of effects that «(shape) the demography of the profession»10. 
As a result, if it is true that there are systematic differences between the philo-
sophical intuitions of men and women, this would also be a consequence of the 
intuition-based style or way of doing philosophy in Western countries. These 
results oblige us to review our methodological approaches to the teaching of 
philosophy. 
Does it follow from this (namely, that women have ‘deviant’ intuitions) that 
there is a connection between having philosophical intuitions and being male? 
B&S’s proposal raises several problems, and a number of objections can be directed 
at it11: i) they discuss only few cases and in many significant thought experiments 
they present (but do not discuss in the paper) no significant gender differences 
were recorded in intuition or, in some cases, it was the intuitions of men, not 
those of women, which were found to be discordant12; ii) their analysis seems to 
9 Ivi: 33.
10 Ivi: 1.
11 Antony 2012: 244-251; Schwartzman 2012: 307-316. 
12 Buckwalter, Stich 2014: 21-22, 26.
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be excessively white-Western-centric. Moreover, they fail to consider the source 
of different intuitions. Even though this failure does not necessarily commit 
them to the idea that differences in intuition are somehow essential or innate 
to women and men, discussing the grounds on which women and men differ 
in their intuition is – I think – crucial if we want to explain why women are 
underrepresented in philosophy and if the source of different intuition might 
have to do with the different self-perception of intelligence or some process of 
socialization. If so, I believe, there is some danger in pursuing B&S’s hypothesis: 
the claim that women and men have discordant philosophical intuitions may 
be branded as sexist13. Their hypothesis, in fact, might fuel gender essentialist 
claims which have had the effect of marginalizing women and intensifying their 
isolation. Also, B&S agree that gender difference in intuition is not the most 
relevant factor involved in the under-representation of women in philosophy. 
But, if the goal here is to find a solution to the gender gap in philosophy, one 
might ask: why should we focus on a factor that is not particularly relevant to 
this issue? Over-inflating gender difference, especially when there is so little 
scientific evidence, as in this case, has serious costs. This question is not just an 
academic concern: over-inflating gender differences may have an influence «in 
many areas, including work, parenting, and relationships»14. Sadly, the unwar-
ranted claims about gender difference harm individuals in many different ways: 
undermining women’s job opportunities, causing problems of self-esteem among 
female students, and strengthening bias and prejudice against women. Instead 
of mistakenly insisting that women and men are different, the point should be 
to try to manage these effects and show that it is fallacious to draw categorical 
claims about gender differences from such minimal statistics. 
These serious reservations about B&S’s thesis mean that we need to be 
cautious15, in accepting it as the main line of inquiry with respect to the 
under-representation of women in philosophy. Rather, what follows from their 
discussion of the role that gender difference in intuition play in philosophical 
education and the data they present is – I think – that philosophical intuition 
carries gender implications and that ideal philosophical intuition is stereotyped 
as male. In the next two sections, my purpose is to offer an alternative to 
Buckwalter and Stich’s empirical thesis and a new explanatory hypothesis for 
the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. More precisely, I will offer 
this analysis as a way of capturing and defending the idea that the notion of 
philosophical intuition is gendered in the sense that is linked to the stereotype 
that having the ‘male’ intuition contributes, at least in part, to male success in 
13 Antony 2012: 250.
14 Hyde 2005: 589.
15 Anthony 2012: 241-243.
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philosophy. Before doing that, in the next paragraph, I will focus on what a 
gendered notion in philosophy might be.
3. Is “intuition” a gendered notion?
Many feminists agree that most canonical philosophical notions require criti-
cal analysis to uncover gender bias. Nevertheless, the issue of how to define a 
gendered notion is a disputed topic within feminist philosophy16 and not all 
feminist philosophers believe that the link between certain canonical concepts 
and gender is a mere association. According to Sally Haslanger17, for example, 
to say that a concept is gendered is not simply to say that this concept is associ-
ated with women (or men) and femininity (or masculinity). Rather, concepts or 
notions are gendered «insofar as they function as appropriate norms or ideals for 
those who stand in [certain] social relations»18, and norms are gendered when 
they provide «ideals that are appropriate to the roles constituting gender»19. 
More precisely, a norm is weakly gendered «just in the case it is appropriate to 
a gender role»20 and strongly gendered «just in the case it is grounded – either 
constitutively or contextually – in a gender role». Therefore, whether a notion 
is gendered depends on how gender and social norms are defined. 
Following Haslanger, to say that intuition is a gendered notion is not simply 
to say that appropriate intuition is associated with men and deviant intuition 
with women. Rather, saying that philosophical intuition is gendered means 
that certain norms (e.g. ideal norms of philosophical intuition or “being a good 
philosopher”) are grounded in certain social relations or are appropriate to a 
social role. Thus, if we seek to understand whether intuition is male-gendered, 
what we need is a notion of gender and an account of what these norms are. I 
am assuming here the notion of gender that many feminists share21: gender is, 
by definition, hierarchical22 and should be defined relationally23. Let us consider 
then whether the norms of intuition are weakly or strongly gendered.
If we take intuition as a strongly gendered notion, one might conclude 
that satisfying the norm of intuition would discriminate between individuals 
16 Witt 2006 e 2007.
17 Haslanger 1993: 246.
18 Ivi: 217.
19 Ibidem.
20 Ivi: 220.
21 Haslanger 2000; MacKinnon 1989.
22 Haslanger 1993: 225.
23 Ivi: 224
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of different gender/intuitive ability. Why? If philosophers consider women’s 
intuitions as deviant and take the right philosophical intuition to be the one 
that only men have, then requiring that “accepting the norm of intuition” is a 
precondition for being a good philosopher is offensive because whoever satisfies 
the norm will see female intuition as wrong and will regard women as bad at 
philosophy. Actually, one might say, this is what happens in our departments. 
As Buckwalter and Stich argue, philosophers (mostly men) who conform to 
the norm of assumed philosophical intuition are recognized as good philoso-
phers. If true, we should reject this ideal because – under conditions of social 
hierarchy and gender inequality – promoting ideals of philosophical intuition 
means promoting oppressive gender roles. In the context of Western academia, 
certain intellectual activities like philosophy are viewed as exclusively male. 
More precisely, for a certain privileged group of men in Western contexts, the 
ideal norms of philosophical intuition are grounded in the social roles defined 
for them (namely, being privileged and intellectually superior to women) and 
are part of the male gender norm.
Nevertheless, this thesis seems to me to be overstated. Satisfying the ideal of 
philosophical intuition is not always offensive. For example, having the standard 
intuition (e.g. that “S does not know that p” in the Gettier case) is not per se 
offensive and whoever has this intuition does not necessarily want to promote 
oppressive gender relations, nor necessarily views women as intellectually inferior. 
Moreover, women may have the standard intuition under gender-fair conditions. 
More plausibly, the norms of philosophical intuition are – I suggest following 
Haslanger’s definitions – gendered in a weaker sense. In the next section I will 
show how male intuitions are appropriate to the male role. 
4. Male intuition?
Being a good philosopher is in part a social issue. The category of philosopher 
is a social constructed; specific philosophers are constructed as kinds of people. 
Namely, the notion of being a philosopher we have and the norms associated 
to this social identity are socially constructed24. This does not mean simply that 
social forces influence this notion. As I noted above, in order to be a philoso-
pher, one has to satisfy certain relation properties: for example, being part of 
a network that an institution (e.g. a university) provides. Being recognized as 
a philosopher has to do with how one is viewed and treated in a philosophical 
community. As we saw, one is a philosopher by virtue of standing in a certain 
relation to others in a particular social context, and the philosopher’s role is 
situated within a complex social system. To be a philosopher means to satisfy the 
24 Haslanger 2003.
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norms function in this role, and this depends on contextual factors. In contexts 
where the norms of “being a good philosopher” functions as a serious model of 
evaluation and of selection, it is a common belief that philosophical behaviour 
is the result of certain traits and capacities that are the real basis for the evalua-
tion. Being a good philosopher means, in part, acting in a certain way. Certain 
norms fix, namely, what is to be like a good philosopher working in academia: 
getting research articles published in professional journals and presenting them 
at conferences, being intellectually acute, performing well during a talk, show-
ing evidence of excellence in teaching, being invited as speaker to international 
meeting, to name a few. Also, as Buckwalter and Stich have shown, philosophers 
tend to take intuition as masculine, and male intuition as part of the ideal for 
“being a philosopher”. In the Western philosophical scenario, only those who 
act as good philosophers receive the approval of academia.
Still, a norm is appropriate to a role when «satisfying [it] would make for, 
significantly contribute to, success in that role»25. Norms are relational, contextu-
ally sensitive and grounded in social relations. Philosophical norms are norms 
taken to be appropriate for a philosopher. On the basis of these norms, the 
philosophical community considers certain performances in this role as good 
and others as not. Also, Haslanger argues, a norm is weakly gendered when 
satisfying it contributes to successful fulfilment of the social role associated to 
the norm. Thus, if we take philosophical intuition as weakly masculine, then 
those who function as philosophers are successful in this role, at least in part, 
because they have male intuitions. In the traditional Western white scenario, 
having an intuition conforming to the male model helps philosophers to func-
tion successfully in the role defined for them.
From this, it follows that the notion of philosophical intuition is gendered 
in the sense that having the male intuition contributes, at least in part, to 
male success in philosophy. If the male intuition is the only right one and the 
norm of philosophical intuition is appropriate to the philosopher’s role, then 
whoever satisfies the ideal norm of intuition (mostly men) has a better chance 
of functioning well as a good philosopher and of receiving the approval of 
academia. As we know, the norm of intuition not only contributes to success 
as a philosopher, but also to the standard the philosophy community uses to 
evaluate philosophers or students. Having no standard intuitions that differ from 
the philosophical norm makes women’s and men’s experience of philosophy 
different. More precisely, under the non-gender-fair condition, the requirement 
of having standard intuitions to be a good philosopher favours men and may 
deter women from pursuing their studies. This norm strengthens the idea that 
women lack the features the philosophy community sees as appropriate for the 
philosopher’s role. Since this causes gender inequality in the discipline, it seems 
25 Ivi: 219.
RE_1_2015_prime2.indd   141 03/02/15   00.52
142
to reinforce the social and political arrangement on which the hierarchical rela-
tion between the two genders relies. If this is so, Buckwalter and Stich are right 
in arguing that we should review our philosophical pedagogy and methodology. 
But, here a question arises: how could we revise and improve our philosophi-
cal methodology in order to actively challenge the gender gap in philosophy? 
This could be done, I think, in different ways. Perhaps we could make the 
weakly masculine norm of intuition gender-neutral. Alternatively, one might 
think that a re-examination of the role the intuition plays in philosophical 
education means simply that we should give up the view that intuitions are 
methodologically important. There are reasons for proceeding in one way or the 
other, but, I will not commit myself here to supporting either solution and I 
leave this issue open. Surely, B&S were making a serious point by proposing a 
change in our methodology in philosophy and I believe we should accept their 
invitation. However, the position I am about to defend here is that we should 
review our philosophical methodology not because, as B&S argue, women and 
men have different philosophical intuitions, but because some philosophical 
contexts undermine women’s performance (in this specific case, for example, 
by not having the standard intuition) and certain philosophical norms have the 
effect of promoting the idea the women are not well equipped for philosophy. 
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